

Series I  
Correspondence,  
1932-1973

Box 6, Folder 17

January 17, 1955-  
March 15, 1955

0429

Box 7  
Incoming Personal, 1955

U.S., U.N. Delegation, Struble letter of 18 January 1955 on  
Hanson Baldwin ideas of U.S. vs USSR, etc.

Senator Knowland's letter, 28 February 1955  
His opinion on international policy

Mamie Eisenhower, 17 October 1955  
Acknowledgement of book

Oldendorf, 3 November 1955  
Leyte and Surigao

0430

Manhattan Beach, Calif.  
17 January 1955. *pm*

Dear Admiral:

Perhaps the less said about the New Year's Day weather and football game, the better ! No, we did not attend the game, rather, we enjoyed it over television. I'm getting too old to enjoy a game in rain or snow.

Hope you had an enjoyable interlude in the Bay Area over the holidays. It is nice to renew old friendships. Did you get to the Bohemian Club ?

Had a recurrence of my "aching back" last fall, and as it did not respond to treatment, I went to the Corona Naval Hospital for a check-up. The C.O. there is a friend of mine, and the newly reporting Exec. served under me some time ago, so I had a very pleasant stay, as well as being fixed up.

I am distressed to hear that you are completely lacking in translator service. It would appear to me that in order to maintain your required standards of excellence, every known bit of documentation should be available to you and that in addition these documents should be accurately and carefully translated. If it would be of any assistance, my services are available in any way you see fit. I can come back there either on a contract basis or on active duty, or I would be glad to do the translations here, although the lack of personal contact might be undesirable to you, in the latter case.

Our son returned from Korea in December and is now at Ft. Monroe, where he will be until June, when he is scheduled to go to West Point as an instructor. We miss them very much, but still have Janet and her husband near, he is finishing his third year in medical school.

Please give my regards to your staff. I understand that Comdr. Zirkle is with you, we are old bridge opponents.

Fay joins me in wishing you a most successful and happy New Year. If there is any way I can be of assistance please call on me.

Most sincerely,

*Joe*

0431



UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
UNITED NATIONS  
MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE  
Room 2111, 2 Park Avenue  
New York 16, N.Y.

18 January 1955

Rear Admiral R.W. Bates  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Rafe:

I have the slightly unhappy feeling that the other night, on our way from the Hotel Pierre to the Yacht Club, that maybe we were hazing you a little. I trust not too much to have caused you great displeasure. I thought we had a very nice party at Jack Bergen's that night. I hope that the next time you come to New York you will give us a call and let us know so that we might arrange dinner at the house or something. Possibly you might come down the night before the PT business. If you decide to do so, give me a little notice.

In view of our discussions off and on, in connection with the Hanson Baldwin articles, I am enclosing one which I am sure you have seen and in which I do not believe that Hanson is quite on the right track. I refer to the second shibboleth and to his statement that "The Soviet Union and its satellites can be defeated today and in the immediately foreseeable future by the United States and its allies without the use of any form of atomic weapons.

Although he indicates the last statement must be qualified, I think it is a rather dangerous statement as it appears to me inherent in the way he has stated it, is the idea that we might give up our atomic know how, etc. The statement then, ~~is the~~ <sup>may be</sup> the basis for a so-called moratorium on atomic bombs as proposed by many of the neutralists and then will definitely lead us into the situation where we let our guard down and are not prepared for the realities of today.

What do you think of this particular article?

I hope the current Knowland dispute will not continue indefinitely. I am a strong admirer of the Senator's strength and vigor -- I only regret that he seems to pop off too quickly at times. In the current case, I think it might have been more appropriate to permit some time to go by before raising the question of whether the Secretary General's mission had been a failure or not.

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Comm-Bates -

Thank you.  
I don't believe  
Baldwin would  
go along with  
giving up our  
nuclear capability  
no matter what he says.


0433

Rear Admiral R.W. Bates  
Newport, R.I.

18 January 1955

Hazel joins me in best regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. D. Struble".

A. D. STRUBLE,  
Vice Admiral, USN.

Encl.

0434

them.

**Dictators Played on Fears**

Hitler and the other dictators played upon this very fear of war and the pacifistic tendencies of the Western democracies prior to World War II. And this psychological shrinking from war as "the worst of all evils" helped the dictators to move, without effective opposition, into the position of strength that eventually, and inevitably, resulted in the bloodiest war in history.

The way to avert war is not by recoiling too much from it. If this country accepts psychologically the dictum that there is nothing worse than war, it has given Georgi M. Malenkov, Soviet Premier, all the aces in a game for great stakes — the struggle for the world.

The nation's fear of atomic war, enhanced, and with good reason, by the frightful pictures the scientists and airmen paint, can so inhibit the actions of government in crisis as to cripple the first line of defense — diplomacy.

This factor undoubtedly had some influences upon United States policies during part of the Korean War, and particularly during the Indochina crisis last year. Now that Russia is acquiring more and more of an atomic stockpile, it may have a more and more crippling effect. If this nation wishes to remain free, it will have to take risks — even the risk of war.

There are things even worse than atomic war. The brutalization of the body, the slow degradation and corruption of the mind, the tortured twisting of the soul and personality that are the results of Communist brainwashing and the inevitable moral, mental, spiritual and physical decline of a nation that puts peace before principles are far worse than atomic war.

Atomic war might mean swift

military victory as quickly and as cheaply as possible is the fundamental aim of war; that communism has such tremendous land armies that victory without atomic weapons is impossible.

They are based, too, on the belief that the Soviet Union will use atomic weapons — which is unlikely as long as this country retains its lead in nuclear arms and in the ability to deliver them.

These views neglect the political, moral and psychological objectives of any war — without which wars are meaningless slaughter. They neglect the fact that global atomic devastation would lead to the ultimate triumph of communism, or some other extremism, not to its extinction. And they sell the United States short. For, not only does atomic war mean, henceforth, atomic devastation for the United States and its Allies as well as for the Communist states, but these views also underemphasize the tremendous physical potential of this nation in conventional arms.

The Soviet Union and its satellites can be defeated today and in the immediately foreseeable future by the United States and its allies without the use of any form of atomic weapons.

This statement must, of course, be qualified.

It is true only if: the West does not attempt to fight an unlimited, unconditional surrender type of war; it does not attempt a deep land penetration of Russia; it establishes reasonable political objectives rather than mere military victory as the war objective; it does fight a peripheral war; it is willing to fight, if necessary, a long war.

But if this nation and its Allies do fulfill these conditions and are not the prisoners of their own limitations, they can defeat Russia without employing atomic weapons.

benefit to the motorists is described by company officials as be increased in reaction. This procedure, com-

# Military Policy Issues

## An Appraisal of the Problems of the West That Congress Might Consider in Debate

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The Eighty-fourth Congress, which convenes today, will debate vital issues of military policy and national security.

Two paramount concepts apparently will influence this debate, as they have already influenced this nation's military and foreign policies.

These concepts are approaching the dimensions of dangerous shibboleths. If accepted by the majority of Congress and the majority of the public, they could weaken fatally: (a) the nation's foreign policy and its "position of strength" in dealing with Soviet Russia; and (b) its chances for any real victory, indeed, its chances for survival in any shooting war.

These two shibboleths, which have already had a sometimes paralyzing influence upon United States action and upon its strategic thought, are:

That there is nothing worse than an atomic war.

That the United States cannot defeat the Soviet Union without utilizing atomic weapons.

The influence of the first of these "security" policies is obvious. If the majority of the nation and Congress become convinced that there is nothing worse than atomic war (or to delimit it, war itself), then obviously Communist aggressions are freed from the restraint of fear — that now to some extent inhibits death; the other represents slow but certain death of more than the physical man.

The second shibboleth, that this nation and its allies cannot defeat Russia without using atomic weapons, is equally dangerous. If it finds general acceptance among United States statesmen and military leaders, this country is committed to an inflexible strategy, and it adds to the influence of those who hold there is nothing worse than atomic war. For the United States then confronts a terrible dilemma; it says, on the one hand, that if Russia commits aggression, it cannot win at all unless it uses atomic weapons, but if it does use them it is better not to fight at all, for there is nothing worse than atomic war. The one shibboleth thus re-inforces the other.

The atomic strategy concept has found a dangerous acceptance among United States diplomats — the policy of massive retaliation is in a sense a by-product of this — and an increasingly dangerous one among military men of all services.

This acceptance is based, in part, upon the limitations of military thinking — that any weapon once invented will be used; that there is no moral difference between weapons, that tai

Jan 24, 1955.

Dear Rafe:

Verily you have dropped from circulation and I begin to worry about you..When I did'nt hear from you at Christmas I attributed it to your paralyzed right hand and your absence on the coast but when I never had any response to any communication I was bewildered..I am sure the enclosed clipping, which may have reached Newport, will bring down the blood pressure of all and "calm your fleeting breath"... Of course I don't agree with them about Mr. Erdelatz..In counting up the number of his victories over Army, they fail to call attention to the fact that Red Blaik was on two of these occasions terribly handicapped by the loss of all his good players through that unfortunate "cribbing" scandal..It also fails to call attention to the fact that Mr. Erdelatz generally loses all his games in order to "point for the Army"..Well...I am heartily sorry that he is re-engaged..He's going to get a licking next year..Blaik's team won't make such silly mistakes as they did this year when in the lead..Remember that when you sit there splitting the 50 yard line with me (as usual)..I will call you to account on all missplays!


By the way, Jane is in Washington with George.. If you go there do look her up...Mrs Juan Jose Pellecer, C/O George Breed III, 1631 34th St N.W., Wash., D.C. If she has left there she is in New York C/O Miss Cordelia Bookwalter, 50 East 72 St...She always asks about you.

Kindest regards to Mickey and his esposa (what is her first name? I always forget it)..I hope it will not be too long before we see each other again..or that your hand will be in condition to hold the pen or the telephone receiver!

Am very much occupied at the Skating Club these days putting the "Samba" on the ice..up to date no one has known how to do it...We have the Rhumba, the Tango, etc but no Samba and as I remember it in Brasil it was very graceful and original..We shall see.

Are we to have war in Formosa? I hope it will blow over. Write when you find a minute and com a expressão de a minha mais alta consideração,

Sincerely,



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BENJAMIN W. ARNOLD, III  
LIFE INSURANCE AND ESTATE PLANNING IDEAS

915-916 INDUSTRIAL BANK BUILDING  
PROVIDENCE 3, RHODE ISLAND  
PHONE UNION 1-1982 AND 1-2687

January 25, 1955

Admiral Ray Bates  
War College  
Newport, Rhode Island

Dear Admiral Bates:

You are kind, indeed, to offer to give thought to the dinner we are having in the organization of a Rhode Island Council of the Navy League of the United States.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Matters, Mr. Franke, and Admiral McCormick are going to be the principal speakers. The various members of the Navy League are also being invited as head table guests.


The dinner will be at Johnson's Hummocks Grill, 245 Allens Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island -- the time: 6:30 for cocktails and 7:30 P. M. for dinner, and the tab is \$3.00.

We are particularly interested in seeing if we can get as large a crowd as possible. We have already about forty-five paid members, but a large part of them cannot come to dinner.

I am going to give thought to the idea of selling tables to the various firms, because this looks like a good thing to do.

Thank you very much, indeed, for your interest, and I hope you can get somebody in Newport to head this thing up for the dinner meeting and obtain as many members as possible.

Sincerely yours,



Benjamin W. Arnold, III  
Member of the Organization Committee,  
Rhode Island Council of the  
Navy League of the United States

BWA,III:fgb  
cc Admiral John J. Bergen

0437



UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
UNITED NATIONS  
MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE  
Room 2111, 2 Park Avenue  
New York 16, N. Y.

26 January 1955

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates  
U. S. Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.

Dear Rafe:

Thanks for your nice letter of 21 January.

I enjoyed your letter very much and was astonished at your last statement concerning "some kind of agreement between the U. S. and Communist China, made through the Secretary General of the U. N. on his visit to Peiping, wherein we agreed not to take any action to assist the Nationalist Chinese in the defense of the Tachen Islands in return for the release of the military prisoners."

I think I can assure you that the Secretary General made no deal of any kind in Peiping, nor did he have any authority from the United States to engage in any deal for the United States.

I believe the PT banquet is about 22 April in New York City. Hoping we will see you then.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

A. D. STRUBLE,  
Vice Admiral, USN.

0438

STAFF COMMANDER DESTROYER FLOTILLA TWO  
FLEET POST OFFICE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

January 27, 1955

Dear Admiral Bates:

You can imagine my pleasant surprise to find a note from you. To say the least Admiral, I feel rather flattered to have received it.

I am enjoying my tour of duty in ComDesFlot TWO and I feel that I have not let you down in your recommendation of me for this assignment. Captain Bird (who has a very high regard for you and the job that you are doing) has repeatedly expressed his complete satisfaction of my work and conduct. Needless to say, I attribute this to the excellent training that I received from an officer whom one very rarely has the opportunity of working for in the present day Navy. Of course, I moaned and groaned at the start, but now I know how foolhardy I was. I certainly appreciate your putting up with me, because if I had left before I had completed my tour of shore duty I feel that I would have perhaps never been able to be fully confident of myself in my rating. The way it is now, since I have worked and learned from the best, I am able to cope with the rest without too much effort.

We returned from a 2½ month's tour of the Mediterranean in November. This was my first tour to the Med and therefore it was a new experience. However, even as much as I do like the sea, it can certainly get rough in the Med on a destroyer (which we were on for a month). During this month we operated almost continually with carriers. To tell you the truth Admiral, I can never recall having operated so strenuously during WWII. By the overall appearance of things the SIXTH Fleet is prepared at any moment for any eventuality--which is certainly the way it should be.

Some of the serious problems that seem to face the operating forces, especially in the Med, is the lack of experienced personnel both officer and enlisted (at least when they first arrive there). As a matter of fact, the engineers on our destroyer had to operate in a 4 on and 4 off status at all times underway. I believe this was the primary reason for so many engineering casualties in the destroyers in our Task Group.

We visited Lisbon, Portugal, Valencia, Spain, Naples, Italy and Cannes, France. Surprisingly, my "California" Spanish came in quite handy in every port we visited--handy enough, that is, to get a glass of wine!

Many thanks again for your kind remembrance of me and Mrs. Burton.

With very best regards and best wishes for your continued success and good health, I am,

Very respectfully,

*Maurice W. Burton*  
MAURICE W. BURTON YNC, USN

0439

Paw

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET  
SERVICE FORCE  
SERVICE SQUADRON TWO

2 February 1955.

Dear Commodore:

I hadn't realized that it has been nearly a month since I received your last letter — time seems to slip by when the pressure is on. In my case, I have been on quite a bit of TAD lately, all of it in the Norfolk area.

I must point out that this latter is partly your fault, because your reputation as an analyst and evaluator seems to be so wide spread that when somebody around here found out that I had worked for you for a while, they felt that some of that ability may have rubbed off on me (guilt by association) and, perhaps, I could do a little of that work on my own. As a result, I was ordered to ComSecondFleet on TAD to represent ComServLant and act as chairman of a committee to evaluate the logistic results of the recent LANTFLEX. Thus, you see, I have advanced from a tyro to a tycoon in the field of logistics in a few short months! We had over a hundred officers on this report with 9 working committees and it took two full weeks to complete the report. I am ~~entirely~~ too modest to tell you what a splendid, super-colossal, extraordinary job my committee turned in. After that, I was made a member of a board to reorganize ServLant and that job was completed just last week.

These are all additional jobs, mind you, <sup>and</sup> the extra work keeps me stepping. Although I must admit that honest labor is my best medicine and my health has been very good. Speaking of medicine and health, my little family has been down with the Flu for the past week but are now recovering. I didn't get it. I hope this letter finds you in good health and at the peak of production.

The Battle of Surigao Straits is pretty well etched in my mind — the motto of Bates notwithstanding — although the part after 0420 is a bit hazy in that I didn't work it out completely. But I do remember this much emphatically — all through the engagement the R. P. LEARY information was only partially true in the highlights, ~~but~~ her track chart was but a rough sketch of her torpedo problem, and her chronological account was both in error and rather vague. Any information she submitted I treated with a great deal of skepticism and used it only when it coincided with the information of others. Furthermore, the A. W. GRANT information was dead after 0420 and the information submitted by CDS 56 was made up after the battle and not definite chronologically. The only definite information is contained in a track chart of the NEWCOMB which appears only on micro-film under her report — the reproduction of the report we have does not have the chart. I recommend that Trembath get the NEWCOMB's report and measure the retirement course and use that, instead of any alleged course which appears in the accounts. There are so many inconsistencies in the

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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET  
SERVICE FORCE  
SERVICE SQUADRON TWO

reports of Attack Section ONE that the data requires a great deal of reconciliation. The actual retirement course, in my opinion, was not too important since the information was so vague, therefore, any reconstruction of that portion of the track is accurate if it dovetails with other more important data.

I hope this might be of some help. Please don't hesitate to ask any questions on this, for I am most happy to try to help if I am able. It is usually a shred of related information that serves as a clue to the final resolution.

Irene and I send best regards to you and add to it a wish for a successful and prosperous new year.

Sincerely,

*Charlie*

Charlie Marinke

0441

QUINDECIM

1 Gray Terrace  
Newport, R. I.  
February 11, 1955

Dear Fellow Members:

As you know, Herbert Brigham has been unable to attend recent meetings due to illness but he hopes to make a gala occasion of the next meeting on March 15th, which will be the 150th meeting of the club. In furtherance of this idea the members present at the February 8th meeting, which Herbert expected to attend but could not, agreed to the following measures and appointed me a committee of one to assist in spreading the word.

- (a) To consider the March 15th Meeting as "Herbert Brigham Night," in recognition of his long services to the club. All members who can do so are urged to be present and to bring a guest.
- (b) Any member who will be out of town on March 15th is asked to send a wire or note of personal greeting, from wherever he may be, to Herbert O. Brigham, c/o Muenchinger King Hotel, Newport, R. I., in time to be delivered to him at the meeting. The manager of the hotel has agreed to hold such greetings to be handed to Herbert who, it is hoped, can be present for this one.
- (c) The members present on February 10th agreed to purchase a suitable present from the club membership to be handed to Herbert at the 150th meeting. General Williams was named as the committee to receive donations and to purchase the present. Members who were not present at that meeting and who care to contribute are asked to send their contributions to Maj. Gen. Seth Williams, USMC (Ret), 110 Eustis Ave., Newport, R. I. Suggested limit \$2.00. General Williams will appreciate early receipt of your contribution.

Hoping that we can have a record turnout for the sesquicentennial meeting, I am

Very sincerely,

  
BERN ANDERSON

0442

CARL HAYDEN, ARIZ., CHAIRMAN  
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA.  
DENNIS CHAVEZ, N. MEX.  
ALLEN J. ELLENDER, LA.  
LISTER HILL, ALA.  
HARLEY M. KILGORE, W. VA.  
JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.  
A. WILLIS ROBERTSON, VA.  
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH.  
SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, FLA.  
JOHN STENNIS, MISS.  
EARLE C. CLEMENTS, KY.

STYLES BRIDGES, ILL.  
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, MASS.  
MILTON R. YOUNG, N. DAK.  
WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, CALIF.  
EDWARD J. THYE, MINN.  
JOSEPH R. MC CARTHY, WIS.  
KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK.  
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MAINE  
HENRY C. DWORKSHAK, IDAHO  
EVERETT MC KINLEY DIRKSEN, ILL.  
CHARLES E. POTTER, MICH.

EVERARD H. SMITH, CLERK  
THOMAS J. SCOTT, ASST. CLERK

*Jim*

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

28 February 1955

Dear Dick:

Your letter of February 23 has been received and is greatly appreciated.

I regret that my schedule did not permit me to accept the invitation to be the speaker at the Long Island University dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria on their Charter Day, March 8.


As you probably know, I have never taken the position of "Asia first". As a matter of fact, I supported the North Atlantic Alliance, the Greek-Turkish Aid Program and other legislation to build a collective security system against possible Soviet aggression in Europe. Where I primarily differed from the last Administration was that I have believed that Communism is a global menace and that it did no good to close the door in Europe if it was to be left wide-open in Asia.

Also I believe that it is important that we take a realistic look at the United Nations and appraise its accomplishments, its potentials and what fundamental weaknesses it displayed in the Korean War and in events since that time. I raised certain questions along these lines in a speech I made in New York on February 22 before the Sons of the Revolution. A copy is enclosed for your information.

Also enclosed is a reprint of an interview that appeared in the December 24th issue of U. S. News & World Report which points out what I believe is the constitutional relationship between Congress and the President.

With best personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,



William F. Knowland

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.)  
U. S. Naval War College  
Newport, Rhode Island

0443



# Congressional Record

United States  
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 84<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Washington's Birthday Address by Hon.  
William F. Knowland, of California

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

HON. WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND  
OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES  
Wednesday, February 23, 1955

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD an address which I delivered last night at the Washington's Birthday banquet of the Sons of the Revolution at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, and members of the Sons of the Revolution of the State of New York, I am greatly honored to be called upon to respond to the toast to General George Washington.

As the leader of the Army of the Revolution he was first in war and his courage and ability played a major part in the winning of our independence.

After this great service to the new Nation, he felt he was entitled to retire, but we consider him first in peace because he presided over the Constitutional Convention which gave us the basic framework of our Government and then later became the first President under the Constitution.

In the period of our national life since then, he has been truly first in the hearts of his countrymen.

While we are here to pay tribute to George Washington and the service he rendered to our Nation, it is also fitting and proper that we review some of the current problems and the effect they may have upon the institutions he did so much to help create and to preserve.

The world balance of power has been so upset that no prudent person can ignore the realities of the situation. Not only the future of this Republic but the hope for a free world of free men largely depends upon the policies that we follow and the firmness with which we and the free nations deal with future communist aggression or threat of aggression.

In the past 10-year period international communism has increased its power, its area, and its population. Ten years ago at this time there were less than 200 million people behind the Communist Iron Curtain. Today over 800 million people live under the most ruthless, godless tyranny the world has ever known.

Recognizing the inherent danger in further Communist conquest, the Government of the United States has undertaken a series of commitments under the North Atlantic Alliance, the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-

United States) Mutual Defense Pact and mutual defense pacts with the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Japan, southeast Asia, and the Republic of China.

The last two treaties were overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate this month.

In a display of national unity that should have encouraged our friends abroad, given courage to the neutrals and opened the eyes of the would-be aggressor, the House of Representatives passed the resolution by a vote of 409 to 3 and the Senate by a vote of 85 to 3.

This action had no sooner been taken and the two treaties ratified than diplomatic moves started on the part of certain Asian and European powers to bend the line of defense in the Pacific and lay the groundwork for a conference which would have all the unfortunate results of a Munich, a Yalta or a Geneva wherein the aggressor gains his objectives at the conference table.

Unfortunately, the history of these conferences has been that it is always the free world that gives up territory and surrenders human beings to the control of the Communists. It is never the other way around, wherein the enslaved people gain their freedom. We must not permit Gulliver to be tied down by the Lilliputians. There are those, at home and abroad, who seek to advance the cause of world government. Until now it has not been a major threat to our Constitution or our sovereignty. The development of the atomic and hydrogen weapon has caused some persons at home and abroad to believe that world peace and security depend upon some form of world state. This is a fallacy that could cost us our freedom.

This country cannot join its political system with the other nations of the world, including Communist or other dictatorships, without diluting our constitutional guarantees. How can a Communist dictatorship, or any other kind, have an equal voice with this free Nation without compromising our constitutional structure of government and the rights of free men? How can a Socialist or Communist economic system be tied to ours without first compromising and then destroying the free economic system, the rights of private capital, and the unregimented life of our people? How can we join our productive capacity and resources to the unproductive who lack resources without destroying the living standards of our people whose enterprise and thrift helped them accumulate property and capital for new industry? This has been the great incentive that has advanced us from a small colony of 3 million to a great Nation of 165 million people, the most productive the world has ever known.

It is one thing for the American people by deliberate choice, after thorough debate, to amend our Constitution to meet changing conditions. To allow it to happen by default would be a betrayal of our responsibilities.

We must not permit court decisions of Executive agreements to raise such to the status of treaties. Nor will we long preserve our Constitution, drafted at Philadelphia under the chairmanship of George Wash-

ington, if we fail to challenge any effort to amend our Constitution by use of a loophole which may provide a treaty or Executive agreement short-cut to what was intended to be a difficult process.

Let us examine the record of the United Nations as an agency for effective collective security as envisioned by some or as a basis for a world government as contemplated by others.

World War II had not yet terminated in 1945 when the United Nations Conference was held in San Francisco. The people of the world did not know that we were on the threshold of the atomic age though those high in Government had reason to believe a vast new power that ultimately could be used for destructive or constructive purposes was soon to be unveiled.

Hopes were high everywhere that the Soviet Union, though a dictatorship, had learned the folly of aggression and of war and because of the vast help given by the free world to them they would be willing to help establish a system of international law and order to preserve the peace of the world for ourselves and our children.

Unfortunately both during the San Francisco conference and in the 10 years that have followed a vast propaganda effort has taken place to build the United Nations into something which its charter provisions could not or did not permit it to become. In the United Nations different people envisioned different things.

Some envisioned it as a mighty force of collective security that would rally most of the nations of the world to resist aggression and preserve the peace. In moments of oratorical fancy some even suggested that the fact the United Nations was in being would warrant free nations to scrap most, if not all, of their armed forces and place their reliance upon the "police power" of the United Nations and the collective moral persuasion of that organization. On June 25, 1950, this concept was shattered shortly after it appeared to be confirmed.

When the Communist forces crossed the 38th parallel, the United Nations Security Council promptly acted and first called upon the Communist aggressor to cease the aggression. The Communists, of course, forthwith showed they were not impressed by a United Nations resolution or the adverse moral reaction of that organization. The Security Council next called on the 60 members of that organization to give aid and support to the victim of the aggression, the Republic of Korea.

What is the record on this? After 3 years of the Korean war, of the 60 members of the United Nations only 17 contributed a single soldier, sailor, or airman to the resistance of aggression. Outside of the United States of America, the other 16 contributed armed forces in the amount of 45,000. The United States of America alone contributed more than 450,000, and we rotated more than 1 million men through the Korean theater of war. The little Republic of Korea, which was the victim of the aggression, supplied over 600,000.



This means that of the United Nations members the United States of America supplied more than 90 percent of the manpower and better than 90 percent of the resources.

When the forces of the Republic of Korea, not being a member of the United Nations (having been kept out by a Soviet veto), are added to those of the United States, it means that our two nations alone supplied better than 95 percent of the manpower.

Does this indicate that the United Nations is an effective instrument of collective security? The answer must come back in the negative.

Our associates in the United Nations so tied us down that a stalemate was all that could be gained after 3 years of struggle in Korea.

We were denied the right of hot pursuit and the enemy was protected in his sanctuary across the Yalu.

With that example are you prepared to risk the future of our Nation and the safety of our people upon the collective ability of the United Nations to function in the event of aggression? The answer likewise must be in the negative.

Has the time not come for a realistic appraisal of just what part the United Nations is qualified to play and to stop kidding ourselves into believing it is something it is not and, in my judgment, cannot be.

There are some who have envisioned the United Nations as a world state to which openly or clandestinely, individual nations would surrender their sovereignty. Some of the more enthusiastic proponents of this type of super state compared the San Francisco meeting with that of our own Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia. Of course, the two gatherings are not comparable when one considers the building of a government upon which man might depend for the protection of his life and his religious, economic, and intellectual freedom.

In the first place, those who met at Philadelphia spoke a common language and had a common heritage. True, they had come from different areas of the world, but they or their predecessors had come seeking a new way of life, freedom from Old World tyranny or a desire to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences.

They had fought a common battle against the mightiest empire of that time. They had carried over from the old country the background of the Magna Carta and of representative government. They had had experience as an independent nation, much of it unsatisfactory, under the Articles of Confederation.

With that background, under what I believe was divine inspiration, drafted the greatest document produced by the mind and hand of man for his self-government and protection of his natural rights.

A little more realistic understanding of the history of the nations gathered in San Francisco should have made it clear that such an organization could not be and should not be considered a basis for world government.

There is no common language or common heritage. Nations which have had no experience with representative constitutional government sit on equal terms with those that have had long experience. Nations of less than 1 million have equal representation with those of over 300 million. The Soviet Union, which is perhaps the most tyrannical government since western civilization entered the modern era, sits as an equal partner with nations with long-established constitutions of law, order, and a respect of the rights of man.

Now, there are those who urge the admission of Communist China which was the aggressor in the Korean war. This, together with the other Communist states, would give that system of tyranny over 800 million people that they claim to speak for.

As for me, as long as I have a voice or a vote in the Senate of the United States, I shall never consent to permitting the guarantees of freedom under our Constitution being diluted or modified directly or indirectly by any organization having in powerful policy positions nations which have no appreciation of or respect for free institutions.

Lest we be gradually edged into such a world state before we learn too late wherein we have been taken, I believe that every candidate for public office—executive, legislative or judicial—should be asked to give a forthright view upon this great public issue. It is later than you think.

The United Nations, if it does not destroy its moral position by actions which I shall mention, does have a function it could perform. It could be a forum wherein the views of the free world and the Communist world might be aired provided that there was assurance the debates in the General Assembly or the Security Council were receiving as widespread coverage behind the Iron Curtain as they do in the free nations.

Otherwise, it becomes a vast propaganda forum for the Communists wherein the point of view of the West does not have the equal opportunity to get to the people in the Soviet Union and its satellites because of the strict censorship those governments exercise.

Even in regard to its position of moral leadership the United Nations has allowed itself to become seriously compromised.

Following the intervention of Communist China into the Korean war the United Nations, after great hesitation, declared Communist China the aggressor. There had been no such hesitation when the small aggressor Communist Korea, crossed the 38th parallel in June of 1950.

To close observers this seemed to indicate that there would be alacrity to pass a resolution and to act against a small aggressor but there would be procrastination and delay in acting against a large aggressor. This seemed to be an abandonment of principle for expediency.

Later, when the evidence was conclusive that the Soviet Union was not only giving moral support to Communist aggression in Korea but was supplying MIG planes, tanks, artillery, ammunition, and other weapons in clear violation of the United Nations resolution and the charter of the organization, no steps were taken to expel the Soviet Union from the United Nations.

Later on, the official representative of the Soviet Union baldly and boldly admitted the fact that such support had been given and in effect defied the United Nations to do anything about it. They did nothing and by inaction underscored their futility when dealing with Soviet charter violations.

Every member of the United Nations knows that the terms of the Korean armistice have been violated on numerous occasions. The neutral nations commission is not allowed to function in Communist North Korea as it was intended though they have complete freedom in the area of the free Republic of Korea. In violation of the terms of the armistice, the Communists have brought in equipment and built military airfields. No effective steps have been taken to require respect for the terms of the armistice.

The most flagrant violation has been the admitted holding of 15 members of the American Air Force, 11 of whom have been sentenced to prison terms of from 4 to 10 years. Under the terms of the armistice it was required that all prisoners of war who wanted to be returned should be allowed to do so.

There is strong reason to believe that there are at least several hundred additional United Nations and United States prisoners

of war being held in violation of the terms of the armistice.

The United Nations passed a resolution expressing its concern in this matter. The Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, made a special trip to Peking. He returned without the release of the prisoners and without any date upon which they might be expected to be returned in the future. It is apparent that they are being held for the purposes of international blackmail on the part of the Chinese Communists.

Impotent and paralyzed, the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly have taken no effective steps to enforce the release of our airmen in accordance with terms of the Korean armistice. Again I ask: "What effective steps, if any, does the United Nations intend to take?"

In the matter of the Chinese Communist aggression against the Republic of China which is a charter member of the United Nations, that organization invited the Chinese Communists to come to New York to discuss a cease-fire.

Arrogantly, the Chinese Communists laid down terms that a victor would be expected to lay down to the vanquished—namely that the Republic of China should be removed from the Security Council and that the Soviet Union resolution condemning the United States should be made the order of business rather than the New Zealand resolution relative to a cease-fire.

When this message was received the United Nations again demonstrated its ineffectiveness by postponing the whole situation, while some of the neutralist friends of the Soviet Union and Red China are trying, through diplomatic channels, to provide for a Far Eastern Munich whereby the Chinese Communists will be given the key coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu and membership in the United Nations. This, of course, would be another defeat for the free world and throughout all of Asia looked upon as another victory for the Communists, comparable to that growing out of the Geneva Conference, wherein the Communists gained control of Northern Vietnam and 15 million more human beings.

I am strongly opposed to the admission of Communist China into the United Nations.

If, as part of a Far Eastern Munich, the appeasers force Red China in I shall devote the balance of my life to taking the United States out.

These are not pleasant facts, and there are many in this country and elsewhere who, because of the vast amount of publicity and propaganda, have gotten a distorted view of the capabilities of the United Nations Organization.

Certainly, in this day and age of the airplane and the atomic weapon, a nation can no more return to isolationism than an adult can return to childhood.

It is important that we have a system of effective collective security and to demonstrate to the Communist world that there will be no further retreats or the abandonment of free people into Communist hands.

This Nation will live up to all of its treaty obligations, and we have the right to expect that our allies will do likewise.

I have a deep conviction that the American people and those throughout the free world who understand the dangers facing us will never again pay the price of another Yalta or another Geneva in order to buy a temporary respite from the insatiable appetite of international Communists to destroy human freedom.

If we as a free people will show the same courage and commonsense that motivated Washington and the others who under divine inspiration gave us our Constitution there are none of our great domestic problems we cannot solve and there is no foreign foe we need fear.

DECEMBER 24, 1954

# U.S. News & World Report

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## SPECIAL REPRINT

# The Knowland Story—

**AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW**

**with**

**The Republican Leader  
Of the U. S. Senate**



0446

# THE KNOWLAND STORY

**EDITOR'S NOTE:** *Why did Senator Knowland advocate a blockade of Red China? Wherein does he agree or disagree with Mr. Eisenhower? Is there a cleavage on foreign policy in the Republican Party, and how does the Senator interpret his obligations as a Majority Leader in relation to the President?*

*These and other questions are discussed by Senator Knowland in the following interview, which took place in the conference room of "U. S. News & World Report" Tuesday of last week. It came in an interval between two all-day conferences at the White House just before the Senator left Washington.*

SENATOR WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND has been helping to shape American foreign policy for nearly a decade.

When, in 1945, Mr. Knowland was appointed, he became the nation's youngest Senator. Elected twice since, he has served on the Foreign Relations and Appropriations committees and as chairman of the Republican Policy Committee. Last year, he was unanimously elected Senate Majority Leader.

As Minority Leader and chief Republican spokesman, Mr. Knowland will continue to play a decisive role in handling the President's legislative program in the new Congress.

**Q** Do you consider yourself, Senator Knowland, a member of the "right wing" or the "left wing" of the Republican Party?

**A** I think these terms a bit difficult to define. I suppose it's from where a person is sitting. I consider myself a Republican—period.

**Q** Do you think these terms—"left" and "right wing"—can be applied to foreign policy?

**A** Again, I think that's pretty hard to tell, because I think it's from the point where a person is sitting. I think it's too easy to oversimplify as to whether a person's philosophical approach applies to a particular foreign policy or not.

**Q** Then you think these terms are used by persons who are critical of others rather than as applied to themselves—people do not call themselves "left" or "right"?

**A** No, I don't think so.

**Q** It's the question of the other fellow calling the person he disagrees with either "right" or "left"—

**A** That's right. I think that very largely covers many of them.

**Q** Would you say that this last vote in the Senate, on the McCarthy case, represented a "left" and "right wing" division?

**A** I don't believe so, no.

**Q** You think that there are men in both parties who on domestic policies would be found in either wing?

**A** Yes, I think the record would demonstrate that.

**Q** How would you classify the Republican Party today from the standpoint of ideology or philosophy? Would you call it a progressive or conservative or radical or liberal party?

**A** I would say it was a moderate party. Again, it is

difficult to classify, but I would say it was moderate-conservative.

**Q** The President uses the term "progressive-moderate"—

**A** Again, it depends upon a person's definition.

**Q** Would you call yourself a progressive-moderate?

**A** No, I don't know that I would say that. I think I am a moderate, but some sitting considerably to the "left" might say that I am conservative and some sitting to the "right" might say I am progressive. It depends upon the vantage point of the viewer.

**Q** Have you in your votes in the Senate supported the Eisenhower Administration?

**A** Yes. In the first session of the 83d Congress, the percentages of support as shown by the *Congressional Quarterly* show that I had 87 per cent in support of the Eisenhower legislative recommendations in foreign and domestic policy, which was the second highest of all the Republican Senators in the Senate.

In the second session, which was in 1954, it shows that I had 91 per cent, which was the highest of any Senator, either Republican or Democrat, including those who were for Eisenhower before Chicago, which I was not. I was for Governor Warren.

But if the President's program is moderate-progressive or moderate-conservative, or whatever it is, I had that batting average in support of it.

**Q** Then do you think, for instance, that the *New York Times* is justified in creating a separate sect and calling it "Knowlandism"?

**A** I long ago learned that, if you're in public life, you have to have a hide that can be harpooned, and so it hasn't bothered me too much. But whatever they were

## 91% Support for Eisenhower Program . . . But Leader Must Speak His Convictions . . . Facing Up to Russia

referring to, mine was the highest percentage of support of the Eisenhower program in the last session and the second highest in the first session.

**Q** *Going to your beliefs on foreign policy, how far back was it that you began to focus attention on the problems of Asia as contrasted with those of Europe?*

**A** I came to the Senate in 1945, in September, and I think either that winter when we had a session or the next January I first talked on Asia.

**Q** *What was your position then? Was it in accord with your Republican colleagues?*

**A** I think generally it was in accord with those of the Republicans in the Senate, and I might say with a good many of the Democrats of the Senate as well. I've never, contrary to some misinformation, favored an "Asia first" policy. When I came to the Senate, I supported Senator Vandenberg's general policies [Senator Vandenberg was the leading Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee]. I voted for the Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall Plan at the time, the North Atlantic Alliance.

Where I differed from the then Administration was that I felt Communism was a global menace, and it would do no good to close the door in Europe and leave the door wide open in Asia. So, I began to direct some attention to Asia because I felt not sufficient attention was being given to it.

**Q** *Has history indicated that that was probably correct?*

**A** I think it has.

**Q** *Have you at any time in your discussions of foreign policy taken what's known as an "isolationist" position?*

**A** Not to my knowledge.

**Q** *What would you consider an "isolationist" today to be?*

**A** Well, I don't know many "isolationists," in the terms normally used, because certainly with the modern day of airplanes and atomic weapons Chicago and Minneapolis are as close to potential danger as San Francisco or New York.

**Q** *Isn't it usually associated with someone who wants to "go it alone"?*

**A** Yes. However, I don't think that that would be necessarily a correct definition in the historical sense of an isolationist.

**Q** *The isolationist didn't want to fight anybody, even alone, did he?*

**A** And he hoped, presumably, that this country could avoid being involved in difficulties that might happen abroad. But, in this day and age of the airplane and the atomic weapon, I don't think this nation can return to

isolation any more than an adult can return to childhood, regardless of how pleasant the recollections might be.

**Q** *Did you ever favor our "going it alone"? For instance, on the blockade of Red China—did you mean a blockade all by ourselves?*

**A** I meant that I felt we had to do something beyond merely sending a note. Certainly I have no objection if the President wants to follow through on going up to the United Nations and getting them to send a note.

But I don't think their note sending will be any more effective than ours, though, of course, there is the possibility it might be. I think the determination as to whether that is effective or not is whether the Americans in uniform get out of Communist prisons. Now, if they don't, I would like to see the United Nations, if it's going to be a collective action, either put on economic sanctions or authorize a blockade. But, if they don't, then I think we have an obligation to these men who are wearing our uniform—taken out of their homes in America and sent on an assignment overseas under orders and shot down in defense of the collective system of security of the United Nations. I think we have the obligation to take the action alone if the others don't go with us.

**Q** *Are you interested in all the Americans who are not in prison but are kept in China?*

**A** Yes. But, of course, we just don't know how many are still alive.

**Q** *The last figures were that there are 57—*

**A** Yes, and there may be more.

**Q** *When you announced that you were in favor of a blockade, did you then state at any time that you wanted a blockade applied alone, without going to the U.N.?*

**A** No. But I said that I thought the blockade would be effective, as a personal opinion.

**Q** *Did you have in mind any actual naval action, or was it the application of sanctions in the home ports of origin?*

**A** I had in mind whatever would cut off all trade with Communist China. I would be prepared to support naval action if that's the only way it could be done.

**Q** *Do you believe it would lead to World War III?*

**A** Well, of course, no one in dealing with the Communist world should ever take a step unless they are prepared to recognize how the Communists might react to it. I think the most dangerous thing you could do to the Communist world is to bluff and not be willing to back it up. But unless the Soviet Union itself is prepared for war, I don't think they will come into it.

*(Continued on next page)*



7:00 A.M.: That was the only time open on Senator Knowland's busy schedule. So editors of *U.S. News & World Report* brought out the coffee pot to fortify all hands.



"I don't think this nation can return to isolation"



I don't think the Chinese Communists are in a position to offset an air and naval blockade of China. If the Russians are prepared to come into a war anyway, why, they probably have their timetable worked out, and what we do won't affect them a great deal.

**Q** *Do you think we should make national policy on the basis of fear that we might get into a war?*

**A** No, I don't think this country was built or has grown on the basis of fear, but rather on faith and courage. I think if you ever get in the position where "coexistence" becomes in fact peace at any price, then inevitably you will have most of the world going behind the Iron Curtain.

**Q** *Won't that possibly produce a war itself?*

**A** I think it's more likely to produce a war than otherwise.

**Q** *Through miscalculation of the enemy?*

**A** Through miscalculation and—for instance, let's be specific: Supposing three months from now the Soviets take action against Finland and give them an ultimatum that they have to set up a coalition Government with Communists in their Cabinet, and the Finns resist and there is another aggression. Then the cry goes up in this country or in Britain: "Well, that's a terrible thing that's happening to the Finns, but is it worth risking New York or Paris or London for Helsinki?"

If the public is in the frame of mind that there's nothing worse than the danger of atomic war, and we do nothing, and then they move into Sweden, and the same cry

goes up: "Shall we risk Chicago or San Francisco, Ottawa or Madrid for Stockholm, or whatever it may be?" then each of the nations on the periphery will go down the Communist drain.

There's just no alternative there. It means under those circumstances that the Communists take them all, one by one! I think the ruthless men in the Kremlin will take that as a go-ahead signal and will inevitably take the balance of the world should we and our allies ever get into the frame of mind of "peace at any price."

**Q** *What if they move gradually throughout Indo-China, or take Quemoy?*

**A** I think the same thing applies, as I tried to point out in my speech in the Senate on November 15. I think it opens up an entire additional technique for the Soviet Union and their Communist satellites to go on a nibbling process around the world, and pretty soon we'll just be nibbled until we're down to a continental Dienbienphu.

**Q** *Do you take the position, then, that we should prevent them from taking the first bite?*

**A** I do.


**Q** *Regardless of how small it is?*

**A** Regardless of how small it is. I think the world balance of power is now so upset that from here on out the future peace of the world is endangered and our future possibility of being able to win the struggle—if one is forced upon us—if we permit any further Communist aggressions.

**Q** *Are you in favor of extending those commitments,*



**"I've never favored  
an 'Asia first' policy"**



—USN&WR Photos

**8:30 A.M.: Questions and coffee were still plentiful as the interview drew to a close. Senator Knowland's car was waiting outside to take him to a White House conference.**

*Senator, in the sense of the islands off the China shore, for example. There appears to be some debate as to whether or not the seizure of those islands would constitute a "bite." Do you think they would?*

**A** Personally, I think they would. It's an arguable point, and people can have honest differences of opinion. I've been on Quemoy Island and while I think it is true that you can lose Quemoy and still keep Formosa, I think from a psychological point of view the loss of Quemoy would have the same effect as the loss of Dienbienphu had on Indo-China.

Now, you can make a perfectly logical case that Dienbienphu, which was a little fortress with a relatively small garrison as garrisons go, could be lost without losing all of Northern Vietnam, but the psychological impact of the loss of Dienbienphu was such that it broke the morale of the resistance in Indo-China at the time. I think the loss of Quemoy would be far more psychological than military, and, therefore, I would not be in favor of their being permitted to take Quemoy.

**Q** Can we keep them from taking it?

**A** I think we could.

**Q** Senator, we published in the last few weeks two articles on the Pearl Harbor disaster, and from all the documents that are available it is apparent that the policy of the United States then was to let the enemy strike the first blow. Are we committed, under this Administration, to the destruction of New York, or Detroit or Chicago, before we will retaliate? Must we accept the

*destruction of American cities as the initial blow, or is there a difference of opinion on the striking-the-first-blow technique? Do you see any discussion developing as to the point at which we might be justified in recognizing a belligerent purpose?*

**A** I would like to reserve any comment on that. I can't speak for the Administration and I don't want to be misunderstood. There are some differences of opinion at this point and I don't think our policies as yet are actually frozen, or fixed. And one reason I spoke when I did recently was to give the amber traffic light before the policies became fixed.

**Q** Is there much debate on that point going on?

**A** I am not at liberty to say whether there is debate or discussion going on, but I think it is one of the obvious problems which the American people have to face up to as the Communist world builds up to an atomic stalemate, or perhaps to atomic superiority.

All these questions are involved: Are we going to be in a better position to face up to the problem six years from now than we are today, if the Communist world is determined on the conflict? Could they be defeated if they attack now, in the judgment of our responsible military people? Do those military people feel, if the Soviet Union make their determination to attack us in six years, that we would be just as able to defeat them in 1960?

**Q** But would we take the first defeat—that's the point?

(Continued on next page)



# ... In war: "Survival of a nation may be decided in 10 days"

A I don't think anybody knows just how this thing may develop.

Q There is an increasing fearfulness among the various governments. What is responsible for that? Do you think the governments have some new information about atomic warfare which isn't generally known but is causing them to hold back?

A Are you speaking of the Allied governments?

Q Yes—

A Well, I think we want to be fair about this situation. Some of those countries had a great deal of destruction in World War II. Geographically they are a little closer to the danger, so even without atomic weapons some of those areas might be overrun in the first two or three weeks of this war. This war may not last as long as other wars have lasted. There may be a situation where survival of a nation will be decided in 10 days. That is not beyond the realm of possibility.

So all of those factors enter into it. I don't think anyone should be unsympathetic or at least fail to recognize that a fellow sitting in Great Britain, which is a relatively concentrated area and close to Soviet air bases, etc., may deal with this situation a little differently than we may deal with it, though our country for the first time in its history is subject to attack on the day war would break out. But in 1917 and 1941 there was at least a question of their gaining control of the seas, and so on.

## MORE STRENGTH NOW—

All those factors enter into it, but assume for the moment, what I believe is the case, that as of today we have atomic superiority, and we have the superiority in delivery of weapons, but that five years from now we may not be in that position.

If that fear of weakness is being expressed today in the capitals of Europe, what will be the situation five years from now, if the Soviet Ambassador goes to the Foreign Minister, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of Country A, and says: "Here is a five-hour ultimatum! You must declare that no American plane will take off from a base in your country. If you do not make that clear as a declaration of your own neutrality, we're going to blast Paris, Rome, London or Madrid,"—whatever country it may be.

Now, will they be better able to stand up at that time than they are today? I think not.

I say that that is why we must not permit them to gain control over additional populations and why they must be resisted now.

Q Maybe we should build some aircraft carriers?

A All those things. I think there is a question that has to be decided, as to whether these bases which we have will be available to us, in the event we are brought under attack.

Q Have you read the article by Professor Niemeyer of Yale in our magazine?

A Not yet.

Q He projects the idea that maybe after 10 years of "peaceful co-existence" we will find ourselves in the position where there will be a war party and a peace party in this country and the peace party will say, "Yes, war is bad; the Russian demands are severe, but if we give in we will exist, and if we don't give in we will be destroyed. Therefore, the choice is existence under slavery or war, and we prefer existence under slavery." He projects that contingency 10 years from now as being the issue in our country—

A In my Senate speech on November 15th last I was trying to point out the dangers in this nibbling operation that each of those countries on the periphery is going to be faced with—and I think a lot sooner than 10 years.

Q How would being firm with the Russians, drawing a line as you suggest, prevent them from building up their atomic strength? Wouldn't we be faced with that in 10 years anyhow?

A No, I think not, necessarily, because it all depends on what else is being done at the same time. The difficulty that I think we are going to be faced with, probably in the spring, is the Big Four meeting, and at that meeting the Soviet Union is going to have a price. They are going to demand, in my judgment—the minimum they are going to demand—is that we recognize the existing frontiers of the Soviet world, which will in effect mean that we are putting our moral and legal approval upon the perpetual enslavement of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and all these other countries. Undoubtedly on behalf of their Chinese allies they are going to demand the Communists' admission into the United Nations.

If they gain that second objective, I think they are going to give such tremendous impetus and face to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai that the balance of Asia will go down the drain so fast it will make your head swim.

So this is something which we might as well begin to get some public discussion about—what price the United States Government and the American people are going to be prepared to pay at a Big Four conference—because it is not something you can keep putting under the rug like a bad housekeeper does the trash. It's going to have to be faced up to.

## PROBLEM WITH ALLIES—

Q Do you think there is any sentiment in the State Department taking that line?

A I don't think there is in the responsible leadership of the State Department at the present time. And I hope and pray that there will be none in the future. But I wish I could say as much for our allies. And our problem will be that unless we have a clearly defined understanding with all the people when we go into a Big Four conference, with the Russians there with their request, and if we find ourselves outvoted three to one—if that unhappy event should happen, at that point do we take the re-

## ... "Some see 'coexistence' as a peace-at-any-price situation"

sponsibility of breaking up the conference with everybody saying, "Well, you may be responsible for starting an atomic war?"

Or do we acquiesce in it on the grounds that we've been outvoted, three to one? Or just what do we do then?

All I am trying to say is that I think that we ought to be sufficiently adult to look at this problem a little in advance rather than to have to meet each crisis as it blazes forth in our morning newspaper.

These problems are going to come up as sure as tomorrow is going to follow today. And I think the American people will react if they have the facts and if they have a chance to be given the facts. But I think we are entering into a whole series of problems on which we better get a pretty basic and sound public opinion—whatever the policy is going to be. And we should get that in advance, rather than presenting the people with a *fait accompli*.

### SENATE DEBATE NEEDED—

**Q** *You don't think debate in the Senate and the House should be suppressed then?*

**A** No. Now, of all the times in our history, I think these questions should be discussed.

**Q** *Do you think there has been enough revelation of facts, or are we getting only partial information?*

**A** I think there has been a great deal of revelation of facts, but I think a full discussion is going to be necessary in the next session. I think it is going to be desirable and I think that our people are entitled to it.

**Q** *Has anyone tried to suppress that discussion?*

**A** No, I have had no personal indications from anybody in the Administration trying to suppress me on it. But I have observed a good many editorial columnists' comments which rather indicate that when a person speaks up he ought to be cut down. And I just don't intend to be cut down. Obviously it's not a pleasant thing to be in difference with your Administration even 9 per cent of the time.

I want to see this Administration a success. It's the first Republican Administration in 20 years. But when I have a deep conviction, as I do on this, I don't intend to remain silent and have my grandchildren 10 or 20 years from now—and I have three of them—say, "You had some responsibility—you had more knowledge than perhaps the public had—why didn't you speak up at that time, when you saw this atomic stalemate, or Soviet superiority coming?"

**Q** *The Majority Leader, it is being said, should not speak up—*

**A** I don't believe that is true. I don't think the Congress should be subordinate to the executive. I don't think that the Majority Leader should be gagged.

**Q** *Do you think your position since 1945 with respect to U.S. policy in the Far East has been consistent?*

**A** I do.

**Q** *And by that might it be inferred that your Republicans in the Senate and others have more or less agreed with you in the past?*

**A** Of course, there've been shadings of opinion, and I never did say that all Republicans would necessarily agree in going as far as I would be prepared to go on it. But I think the general policy of recognizing the importance of Asia has been one that has had strong Republican support, and I think rather strong Democratic support, too.

**Q** *Have you had any protest from any of your Republican colleagues since you recently announced your position?*

**A** No, I have not.

**Q** *Not among the members of the Senate?*

**A** No.

**Q** *Is there any difference of opinion among Republicans with respect to the Far Eastern policy?*

**A** I think basically not, though they might differ in degree. And I've had a great many Democratic Senators as well as Republicans who have been generally in support of President Eisenhower—some of them who supported him prior to Chicago—tell me they think that basically the position I've taken is sound and needed to be taken.

**Q** *Do you mean that there have been no members of your party who told you that they disagreed with your position—*

**A** I do not say that there aren't some who disagree—

**Q** *But you have had no statements of disagreement from them—*

**A** That's right.

**Q** *Would you say that the present policy is one of peace at any price?*

**A** No, I do not think that it is. But I think that there are some of our allies, and I think that there may be some people in this country, who are gradually getting into the position where they understand "coexistence" as being a peace-at-any-price situation.

### DIFFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT—

**Q** *The President has said that he doesn't believe there are any fundamental differences between you and him—*

**A** I think that is correct.

**Q** *There is a difference as to methods, he said—*

**A** Yes.

**Q** *What do you think he meant by "methods"—timing?*

**A** We might just take this question of the blockade as an example. He may very properly feel that he wants to take some intermediate steps. After all, he's a military man. He was our commander in Europe. He's President of the United States. He's just as concerned about these Americans who are prisoners as any of the rest of us are. But I think that he may prefer to operate through the United Nations and see if that will work out.

(Continued on next page)



## ... In a blockade of China: "I'm prepared to accept risk"

**Q** Well, if he's just as concerned, what justification would you say you had for speaking out about it at the time that you did?

**A** The reason I felt this concern is that I've also been concerned about the American civilians who have been in China. In 1951, I took this matter up, first with the State Department privately for a good many weeks—I think for several months, as a matter of fact—and finally could get no satisfaction that any effective steps were being taken regarding these Americans.

At that time, in December of 1951, I released for the first time the names of the 32 American civilians who were in prison. Mr. Acheson [then Secretary of State] took a very dim view of the situation, as did his Under Secretary, Mr. Webb at the time, who raised some objection to my having released the names. It was the first time that the American people had been fully informed that we had 32 Americans in Communist jails. But my mail from the families and associates of those in jail was, I would say, 90 per cent favorable to it, and the response from the country was also favorable. And I have since seen a number of those who have come out of Communist jails, and they thought it was helpful to call attention to the condition under which they were imprisoned.

### PRESSURE ON UNITED NATIONS—

**Q** When you spoke out, there was criticism. The argument was made that nobody in the Senate should rock the boat, and particularly that the Majority Leader shouldn't be heard from at all on that issue. What do you think about that?

**A** First of all, I think I have a responsibility as a United States Senator. Secondly, I think actually it might have been helpful to both Secretary of State Dulles and the Administration in dealing with the United Nations to point out that there was considerable ferment—as I think there is—in the Congress and in the country, and therefore help give the United Nations members a sense of urgency; that if they're going to act, it isn't something that can be dragged on for three or four years with these American soldiers. They are unlike the American civilians who went there under their own volition.

While I think it is an outrageous thing that men who are professors or missionaries or students should be rotting in Communist jails for three or four years, as some of these civilians have, at least they went under their own power.

Now, when you take American men, put them in uniform and send them there, and then, in violation of international law and the letter and spirit of the armistice, they are kept in jail, why, I think we've got to do more than merely send a note—our sending notes or the U.N. sending a note, while these fellows one year, two years, three years from now are still in jail. I think we would undermine the morale of our armed forces if that happens.

**Q** Then you think your speaking out was helpful in crystallizing public opinion?

**A** I think it was.

**Q** Why was there so much criticism? A lot of people supporting the Administration opened fire on you—

**A** I recognize that, but I don't understand why that necessarily should have come. I was prepared for it. That is one of the penalties you have to assume if you do speak out.

**Q** Well, that raises the question of whether we are moving toward a peace-at-any-price attitude, doesn't it? Do you think the elements that attacked you were predominantly those that feared your mention of blockade would lead to sterner steps?

**A** I think there's a possibility of that, and, of course, I, again, don't believe that we should ignore the possibility that a Russian submarine might intervene in the blockade and try to sink an American vessel, or they might give a submarine to the so-called Chinese "volunteers," or they may operate them under the Chinese flag, as presumably they were operating MIG planes in Korea. That's always a possibility. And no responsible person should advocate a policy unless he recognizes that there might be certain actions. I am prepared to accept that risk. We have to do more than merely send a note in this instance.

**Q** Do you think the Administration has had under study, as a theoretical solution, perhaps, the blockade?

**A** Where they're dealing with various potentials, I think undoubtedly a study has been given to this and other questions. I am not prepared to go into detail on that.

**Q** Senator, do you think there is any support for your position in the State Department itself?

**A** As of this moment—that is, a blockade going on before this other course has been followed out—I would say, perhaps, very little. But if we are not successful in getting these men out, then I think there might be some support.

### TIME LIMIT ON WAITING—

**Q** What time limit do you think should apply in that case? How long should we wait?

**A** I personally expressed the opinion that if these people are not out by the time Congress reconvenes in January, I think this is going to be a major issue in the next session of Congress.

**Q** Do you think the Democratic leadership will refrain from making any comments on this situation?

**A** No, I don't believe they will if this United Nations action is not effective.

**Q** Do you hold the view that Senators should keep quiet on foreign policy and say nothing and let the President do the whole thing?

**A** No, I've never subscribed to that theory. I think if there had been some discussion prior to Yalta and some

## ... "I look upon Congress as a coequal branch"

of the other wartime sessions by people who were in a position to have some facts, we might have avoided some of the pitfalls we got into.

**Q** *You don't think that if a Majority Leader doesn't agree with the President he should resign, as has been suggested?*

**A** No, I don't. First of all, I would like to give you my concept of the Majority Leadership. In the first place, under the 20 years of the New Deal, the wrong concept developed on the position of Congress under our constitutional system, and its leadership as well, that it was almost a subordinate body to the executive.

Now, under our Constitution, that is not the American concept, and certainly isn't my concept, of the balance between the three branches of the Government.

### MAJORITY LEADER'S DUTIES—

I look upon Congress as a coequal branch. I think it was meant to be a coequal branch. I think I can best express what I think the Majority Leader is by, first, saying what he is not. He is not an administrative Cabinet official who can be appointed and dismissed at will by a President, whether the President is a Democrat or a Republican, and I don't believe he should be. He's not an Army officer who can be disciplined by the commanding general. He has a dual responsibility—a dual job. One is to represent the views of his party in the Senate, and in a kind of broad sense of the Senate itself, to the White House. Secondly, he is to interpret the views of the Administration to his party, and where he finds that there are differences between the two, try to work out areas of agreement with regard to those differences.

I think that a Majority Leader would not be discharging his responsibility if he attended White House meetings knowing that the sentiment of the Senate on a particular issue, whether it be a domestic or a foreign problem, was substantially one way or the other and should remain silent and then come up to a point where there was a major conflict developing between the White House and the Senate.

It was on that basis that Senator Taft, when he was alive and I was chairman of the Policy Committee—long before the controversy over the so-called "Bricker Amendment" broke into print and got into the situation that finally developed—worked constructively not only with Senator Bricker and the American Bar Association, and others who were concerned on this question, but with the State Department and the Department of Justice and with the Administration—with all those who were concerned with the problem—to see if we couldn't find an area of agreement.

On at least three different occasions we felt that such an area of agreement had been found. But at the last minute the thing was kicked over, once by one side and once by the other, and when it went to a vote, the final George substitute was defeated only by a single vote.

But what it did bear out, I think, and what we pointed out to the Administration, was that the sentiment both in the country and in the Congress was very strong, demonstrated by almost a two-thirds vote by both the Republicans and Democrats. And if an area of agreement could be worked out, it would have been advisable and constructive to do so.

**Q** *Many people agree that Congress and the President are coequal, but they feel that's largely applicable to domestic policy. They have the feeling that the President should have the right to conduct foreign policy alone. Does that alter your concept at all?*

**A** No, I think not. I think that by the treaty provisions of the Constitution the President should get the advice and consent of the Senate. I think the Senate has a responsibility in this treaty-making process and that Congress has in the entire field of foreign affairs. We have the warmaking power certainly—though that was short-circuited to a considerable extent in the Korean war.

I felt that that was a great mistake for President Truman not to come to Congress. I was not critical of him for the action taken, because I think action had to be taken in Korea, but for the methods used. If action had not been taken, perhaps by this time Japan would have gone behind the Iron Curtain and down the Communist drain.

I believe just as certainly as I sit here today that had President Truman come to the Congress and laid the matter before them as it was before the United Nations, there would have been overwhelming support from the House and Senate for the action.

I think the Truman Administration established a very dangerous precedent for the future of this country by having committed our forces without getting the approval of the Congress, or at least coming to Congress immediately thereafter and getting an approval of the action that had been taken the day before. This is a field in which I think the Congress has a proper interest.

### A LEGAL "STATE OF WAR"—

**Q** *Do you think that, if the matter had gone to Congress, there would have been a legal state of war between ourselves and the aggressor countries?*

**A** There might have been a state of war. I don't know just what procedure the President would have recommended. That seems to be a moot question. Since we were committing the American Air Force, Army and Navy, I think the constitutional way would have been for him to come before us and ask that a state of war be declared or that the Congress authorize the use of American forces.

**Q** *Had there been a state of war, we would not have been prevented in applying the blockade at the time, which we apparently did not—*

**A** That is correct.

(Continued on next page)

# ... "Senator Vandenberg was not consulted in regard to Yalta"

**Q** So that, by not declaring a state of war, we confined ourselves to what the President then called a "local police action"—

**A** I suppose from a technical, legal sense that's true, but we had the fourth largest war in our history—no matter what you call it.

**Q** The Chinese weren't in it at the start, were they?

**A** No. They presumably were not in it at the start, though I think there were even then some Chinese troops masquerading as North Korean divisions.

## BIPARTISAN ACTION—

**Q** Wasn't that the argument in the State Department against going to Congress, that it would produce a legal state of war and would necessitate taking action against Communist China?

**A** That may very well be the case. The interesting thing was, of course—and I did some considerable research on this at the time there was some criticism of President Eisenhower for not carrying on bipartisan consultations. I gathered the information and made a speech in the Senate on May 11th of this year and documented the number of conferences which had been held in the year and a half of the Eisenhower Administration up to that time, precisely who attended, what the subject matter was, and where the meetings were held, either in the Secretary of State's office or in the White House or in the committee rooms, and so on, and there has been the fullest type of consultation.

I don't believe today you could talk to a responsible Democratic leader of the House or Senate—or the ranking people on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee or the two Armed Services committees—who would not admit to you that President Eisenhower and his Administration hasn't consulted, really consulted, with the majority and minority members of Congress far more fully than they have been consulted in any recent Administration of our country. I think that record is a success and a challenge.

Now, by contrast with that, the Korean war broke out on Saturday, June 24th, our time, which was the 25th of June Korean time. President Truman was not in Washington at the time. He came into Washington the following day and held a meeting at the Blair House that was attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and certain key administrative people. There were no members of Congress present at that meeting. They met again on Monday, the 26th—

**Q** On that first meeting, they took action?

**A** No, not military action. On the first meeting they met and discussed the problem and the steps to be taken at the United Nations. The second meeting was held on Monday, the 26th. On the evening of Monday, the 26th, they finally sent out a message to General MacArthur

that he was authorized to commit American air and sea forces to resist the aggression in Korea.

Again, there were no members of Congress consulted on that. That message went out at about 9:30 at night on Monday, the 26th—it was not until the morning of Tuesday, the 27th, congressional leadership was first called to the White House.

At that time I was not in the echelon of party leadership, but I have discussed the matter with people who attended, and that time, when the Republican and Democratic leaders were called into the White House, the President had a prepared statement which was read to them. In fact, it's the same statement which was released to the press. It had already been mimeographed. And when they had got back to Capitol Hill, the announcement was already on the wire-association printers in the reception room outside the Senate.

**Q** They weren't asked for their opinion—

**A** They weren't asked for their opinion. They were told that on Monday, the 26th, the American forces had been committed in Korea. So that that is the difference in operation between that Administration and this one. Senator Vandenberg personally told me—and he stated it on the floor of the Senate publicly, as a matter of fact—that he had never been consulted in regard to Yalta and he had not been consulted in regard to certain of the Far Eastern decisions that have been made. He was consulted on the United Nations and on certain European decisions, but, as far as Asia was concerned, he was not consulted.

## FULL CONSULTATION NOW—

**Q** We actually went to war without Congress being informed—

**A** That is right. And what is worse, Congress was in Washington. It was not even a question where you might get an emergency-type action, where the Russians might start across the Elbe and Congress would be in adjournment and it was a matter of the destruction of your forces-in-being if some action weren't promptly taken. But here was a case where Congress was in Washington, and yet the leadership was not consulted until after the basic decision had been made to commit, and then it was in a formal type of thing where they were merely told what had happened and not consulted on it. And then, after we were committed, they didn't come to Congress and say "You weren't consulted for these reasons," but, "Here is the problem; our forces are committed, and we ask for either a declaration of war or a ratification of the facts."

**Q** You think, then, Senator, that before imposing a blockade the President should consult Congress?

**A** Yes, I think that's entirely proper.

**Q** He should have the agreement of Congress—

**A** I think he should come and lay the facts before them and say what his recommendations are, and under

## ... Korean armistice: "I think it's a farce"

those circumstances I think he would have the support of Congress.

**Q** *Do you feel that the necessity for consulting Congress arises out of the importance of the treaty-making power or out of the power of appropriation, or under the power to declare war?*

**A** I think it comes under all three of them. I think primarily it comes under the constitutional power to declare war. I think it also, however, relates to the treaty-making power and because, as you have quite properly pointed out, in every treaty of the mutual-security type that I can now recollect which has been ratified by the Senate since I have been in the Senate, they have all contained a provision relative to constitutional processes, and it also enters into the fact that Congress is charged with the responsibility of the maintenance of armies and navies and must appropriate for any armed action. I think, again, that is the proper course to consult with the Congress.

### WHEN PRESIDENT CAN ACT—

**Q** *That doesn't mean that if an emergency requiring instantaneous action should arise, the President should wait and go to Congress, does it?*

**A** No. I don't think anyone would challenge the fact—and I think this has been stated on the floor of the Senate on numerous occasions—that if the Russians moved across the Elbe, Congress were not in session and where, as you saw in World War II, some of these countries might fall in five days' time—Holland, for instance, once the Germans started to move into their country—where time is of the essence and you might have our entire expeditionary force destroyed if certain action couldn't be taken, no one would expect the President of the United States to stop and wait three days for Congress to be reassembled.

But they would expect the Congress to be immediately called into session and, as soon as they could assemble in Washington, for him to lay the facts before them as to his recommendations.

**Q** *Hasn't that actually been true in a number of cases where the President has gone to Congress for ratification, as he did over the Vera Cruz incident in the outbreak of trouble with Mexico before World War I?*

**A** That is correct. One other factor, and I think it was on July 8th of 1953—I got a little abuse when I made that talk, also—I pointed out that one of the great weaknesses, in my judgment, of the armistice that was then being presented and approved in Korea was that the Chinese Communists had not signed the armistice, and I pointed out that they might then try to renege while we were obligated by General Clark's signing on behalf of the United Nations Command, and he was our own General there—that we would be bound and the Republic of Korea would be bound, but the Chinese Communists would not be. Actually it was signed by

the "Chinese volunteers." Now, I noticed just the other day up at the United Nations they raised that point that the Chinese Communists had not signed the armistice—

**Q** *The Communists raised that point?*

**A** Yes, and also in a broadcast from Peiping. Now, as was correctly pointed out there, in view of all the circumstances in that the Chinese Communists were in there in fact, if they hadn't signed it, they had no business going to Geneva. So, they were in a kind of untenable position. But, nevertheless, they were apparently trying to use that loophole that was there.

**Q** *They did accept responsibility in Geneva for the peace in Korea, did they not?*

**A** Yes.

**Q** *Do you think granting them an armistice was a mistake?*

**A** I thought so at the time and I have not changed my views on that. But that's water over the dam now.

**Q** *And the armistice isn't even being abided by—*

**A** No. There are also other violations. They have sent supplies into Korea in violation of the armistice. And there are very strong indications that the Communists have built highways and, perhaps, a railroad line 20 or 30 miles away from the port of entry and have refused to permit the neutrals to go inspect and run down the reports and have refused to permit them to go to other places where we have felt there were planes shipped in, and so on.

I think it's a farce. I think it's a clear violation of the spirit of the armistice agreement, but I think it indicates once more the dangers of the meetings with the Communists unless you spell everything out as to just precisely what is meant. That was one of the problems that arose out of Yalta. They spoke of free elections. They interpreted it one way and we interpreted it another.

**Q** *We wouldn't have had an armistice if we had insisted on spelling everything out—*

**A** Well, I think we would have. I think they were desperately eager for an armistice at that time.

### BLOCKADE OF CHINA?—

**Q** *In the event of a blockade, what do you think would be done about Communist China's trade with Russia, which is the great portion of her trade?*

**A** Of course, they are not going to stop the sending of stuff over the trans-Siberian and some of those railroads, but for every ton that they have to send into China because of a sea blockade, it means they are going to be able to send that much less aviation gasoline to prepare themselves in the event they have any ideas of aggression on their own account, and it is going to put stresses and strains on the logistical problems of the Soviet Far Eastern forces.

*(Continued on next page)*

## ... "Best chance of keeping out of war: position of strength"

So, I think the Russians are not going to be any too happy about having to pick up this extra burden on this very long supply line out there in order to take care of their Chinese neighbors.

**Q** *The suggestion is that it would be a squeeze, but not enough of a squeeze to make any real difference. What about that?*

**A** Well, you can always get arguments on these things, but until it is tried I think it will be a substantial squeeze. I think we have enough figures to know what has been going in by sea, to know that if it were cut off it would cause some very serious dislocations to the Chinese Communist economy. We think that it will make it so costly to them that they will begin to doubt very fast as to whether holding the Americans in prison is worth the price they are willing to pay.

**Q** *Would this also block their own trade in their own ships?*

**A** You can't stop every small junk going from one coastal city to another, perhaps. But you can block a good deal of the transoceanic trade and intercept even some of the coastal trade.

## HELP FROM BRITAIN—

**Q** *Senator, if this were not an Allied venture, wouldn't we be in the position then of stopping, say, British and other European ships?*

**A** Certainly, but I would hope, in view of the fact that we supplied 90 per cent of the manpower in the Korean aggression and that, out of the 60 member nations, only 16 of them had supplied any troops, and of the 16 who did, we supplied 90 per cent of them—and with the American uniformed men being held in clear violation of the international law and common decency—that we would have the support of Great Britain.

I've been pleased with the British at the U.N., and Anthony Eden in Great Britain. They have taken a very strong stand in their indignation over what has happened. And I would certainly hope they would support us. But, support us or not, I think primarily these are United States airmen. They're not the United Nations'. They don't wear the uniform of the United Nations.

Now I would be as happy as anybody if, having ignored our own notes, the Chinese promptly released these men on the application of the United Nations and we would then not have to take any further action. So much the better. But, if they don't, then the responsibility is ours.

If I'm to be asked to draft young men—I've supported Selective Service and expect to support it again—out of the homes of this country, I don't intend to sit silently while any of them are in Communist jails for 4 to 10 years.

**Q** *Do you think it was the threat of American force or some other reason that made the Communists release*

*the people they did in Europe—Robert Vogeler, and others who were being held?*

**A** That's a sad story because part of it was paying extortion to get them out. In some instances they were thinly disguised cases, but I think that it was not the threat of force.

**Q** *Did the Europeans get some of their nationals out without making concessions?*

**A** You just don't know what they have to do to get them out. But I am saying that some of our cases in the past have been thinly disguised paying of international blackmail to get them out.

**Q** *Do you think they expect us to pay the price of admission to the U.N.?*

**A** That may be one of the things they have in mind—or they may have some other price.

**Q** *Do you think they were encouraged by these other instances to try again?*

**A** Any time you pay blackmail you increase the demands, and I think the more that is paid the greater the demands will be. And I think you come to the point with any self-respecting individual or nation where the price becomes so high it can no longer be paid. I think weakness invites war.

I don't think this is a war policy which I am suggesting. The people who have had dealings with Communists in Europe or in Asia, those who have had the most experience with them, have constantly pointed out that a position of firmness will cause them to back down. There is the Berlin blockade, and there are other instances where if you show weakness they will push just as far as they think you can be pushed.

And the more you permit them to push you and the greater they are able to increase the power, I think the greater the danger of our being involved in war. And I think the best chance of keeping out of war is maintaining a position of strength, and deal with them on the basis of strength.

We of course want to preserve peace. But I think there is a vast difference between preserving peace with honor and peace at any price. And I think that has to be spelled out to the American people.

## IS "COEXISTENCE" WEAKNESS?—

**Q** *Then you are saying that "peaceful coexistence" is synonymous with weakness?*

**A** I think it all depends on what interpretation you place upon "peaceful coexistence."

**Q** *What do you mean?*

**A** Well, whether it is peaceful—the words are perfectly good words, just as "free elections" were good words, or "people's democracies" are good words—but they were neither democracies nor run by the people. The "free elections" they held in Poland were not free elections. But because they weren't spelled out the Russians put their own interpretation on them.

## ... "I've never advocated preventive war"

So I think there is nothing wrong with the words, "peaceful" and "coexistence," provided you have peace and you are coexisting, as I pointed out a few weeks ago, beyond the condition of the Thanksgiving turkey which coexists up until two days before Thanksgiving, and then the ax falls on its neck.

Now if that is what "peaceful coexistence" means, I don't think the American people want to buy that. But I think that's precisely what the Communist world has in mind for us. Now if you can get them to stop the constant agitation and constant pushing out to destroy the free governments, if you can have any assurance on it, that would be one thing. But every agreement they have entered into in the last 20 years they have violated.

They had agreements of mutual assistance and so on with Finland and they invaded Finland.

They had a mutual-defense pact with Poland, and when Poland was being attacked from the front they went in and stabbed them from the rear.

They had an agreement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, that his would be the only government they would deal with, and the ink wasn't even dry on it when they were turning over the captured arms and equipment of the Army of Manchuria to the Chinese Communists of Mao Tse-tung.

They have violated every agreement they have entered into. They had agreements of friendship and mutual security with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and they went in and destroyed those three Baltic republics.

With that clear record, I think we are a little naïve if we think because they merely say they are going to peacefully coexist with you that that means you're going to be allowed to peacefully coexist.

**Q** They say that Malenkov is entirely different from Stalin.

**A** I doubt that very much.

## RESISTING AGGRESSION—

**Q** Senator, in the European press and London papers they are associating you and your speeches with what they call "preventive war." Do you think that's a justified "guilt by association"?

**A** No, I don't think so. I've never advocated preventive war, but I do believe that, as I said at the beginning, we should not permit them to move in and take over additional areas of the world.

**Q** Does that go for every place in the world?

**A** I think we now cannot be unconcerned with any additions to Communist manpower or resources anywhere.

**Q** Would you say your policy would be to recognize the fact that, if they initiate war, we reply to it?

**A** I guess that's what it would be.

**Q** Senator, do you think a blockade might be considered as an act of aggression by the United Nations?

**A** I don't believe so under the circumstances. It's merely a response to a violation of the armistice—a clear

violation of the armistice by the Chinese Communists. It would be put on for the purpose of leading them into compliance with the armistice and would presumably be lifted when they had complied.

**Q** You mean it would be done by the United States alone?

**A** Conceivably the Russians may make that point, but I can't believe that the United Nations is going to put itself in what I think would be an absurd, impossible situation—wherein we respond and join in a collective-security action and supply 90 per cent of the forces, and some of those forces are held in violation of the armistice and we ask them to assist in getting them out, and, assuming that the Communists don't respond to that request—that either, (a) the United Nations itself would not authorize a blockade, or (b) if they didn't want for various reasons to do that, would try to interfere in our getting out men who had gone there under United Nations resolution. That I think is inconceivable.

Of course, anything is conceivable. You had six nations that didn't supply a single soldier or sailor to the resistance of aggression, though they benefit generally from a collective-security system and yet were not even prepared to stand up and cast a vote of moral indignation against this treatment of American prisoners. When that can happen—and it just happened this week—I don't believe the United Nations wants to completely destroy its moral position in the world.

## IF THE U. N. DOESN'T ACT—

**Q** Before laying on such a blockade, shouldn't we consult the United Nations?

**A** The President has followed the course of submitting this matter to the U. N. As I say, I hope that's successful. I have my doubts that it will be. But it may be.

Now if they do not do that, as I pointed out the other day, the test by the American Congress is going to be: How effective is the United Nations action? We can assume either that they get out or they don't get out. If they get out, why that solves that problem. If they don't get out, then what is the next step the U. N. is going to take?

There are provisions in the U. N. Charter which clearly set up certain steps short of armed action. One of them is cutting off all air, sea, radio, telegraphic, cable communications—kind of an application of sanctions—they might try that as the next step.

Then in the following article, Article 42, there is a setup again short of the provisions which deal with armed action—a blockade. And I think they might try that.

But whether the Soviet bloc will filibuster that, in the event either one of those steps were taken, or whether there will be added to the six nations that weren't prepared to express their moral indignation, whether there won't be a great many more that will be fearful of taking any official steps, and supposing they say, "Well, we just

(Continued on next page)



# ... "I don't think there will be an effective third party in 1956"

can't get the votes to do any of those," and sit back and let our people serve in jail—now that's the question. But I think it's going to have to be answered by this Government and to the American people. If we do go to the United Nations before laying down such a blockade, maybe we run into a filibuster, maybe we run into a situation where we are blocked.

**Q** Well, Senator, it seems to me this thing has gone off on a tangent. Didn't we go into Korea as a collective action of 16 nations? Didn't we get the authorization of the United Nations? Didn't we then fight a war? Didn't we sign an armistice? Didn't we then see the armistice violated? What has the United Nations got to do about it? Haven't those 16 nations alone got to decide whether to resume hostilities, apply sanctions, or do anything to secure obedience to the armistice? Why does it have to go through Article 41 or 42 or anything else?

**A** I don't think it has to go there, but I think that the Administration has felt that it would, and I would not care to dispute that. They may feel that the value of the moral pressure of the world, of having more than the 16 members is worth while, and that the Chinese Communists might pay some attention to that, whereas the 16 nations alone they might look upon as the nations which have been fighting against them. So I don't think we had to follow this procedure, but at least we have followed it.

**Q** But if it fails, don't we have recourse to the 16 nations?

**A** I think we do. I don't think our hands are tied in any event.

**Q** But if there is not an alternative to what the U. N. is doing and our going it alone, we still can go back to the 16 nations, can't we?

**A** But again I say that I think that a large number of them would agree, but supposing some of them don't? Are we then to give them a veto while persons wearing the American uniform, taken out of the homes of America, sent under orders, put in a place where they have every right to be, are sentenced for from 4 to 10 years in a Communist prison? And that responsibility the Government of the United States cannot, in the final analysis, escape, if the alternative fails.

## ACCORD OF REPUBLICANS—

**Q** What about the Republicans in the new Congress? Are they going to support the President?

**A** Yes, I think so. I think that those who have been trying to develop a permanent division in the party over-exaggerated the problem. I think our Democratic brethren are going to have some cleavages of their own, once they start putting legislation out of some of these committees. It is one thing to get—my apology for using these terms—your "conservative" wing of the Democratic Party to join together and recommit to the committees one of President Eisenhower's proposals, as was done in the last session—but it is something else to affirmatively

get something out that is going to please Mr. Lehman, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Morse at the same time it is pleasing Mr. Byrd, Senator George, and some of the others. So they're going to have a few problems of their own.

**Q** Do they have a "left" and a "right wing"?

**A** I wouldn't want to designate their wings, but they do have some basic differences of opinion—let's put it that way.

**Q** Has there been harmony in the White House meetings?

**A** Yes, there has.

**Q** No violent arguments?

**A** No, they have been constructive meetings. They've been harmonious and there has been a full expression of thoughts.

## WHEN TO CHANGE LEADERS—

**Q** It has been recalled that some years ago, when Senator Barkley disagreed with President Roosevelt on the veto of a tax bill, Barkley resigned as Democratic Leader. Apparently, you think that tradition did not demand his resignation—

**A** No, I don't think it did. And, as a matter of fact, I am responsible to the 47 Republican Senators in the 84th Congress. They're going to meet on January 4, the Republican Senators, to elect their immediate leadership. Under our custom new leaders are elected or old ones re-elected each two years.

Whenever a majority of 47 Republican members determine to make a change, they have it within their power to do so. So just as a United States Senator's candidacy is submitted to the people of his State every six years, so the candidacy of the Leader is submitted in fact to his party membership each two years.

**Q** Do you feel that a President has a right to interfere in the contest to select the Senate Leader, as Mr. Roosevelt did with Mr. Barkley originally?

**A** No, unless you are prepared to accept the concept that Congress is a branch subordinate to the executive, and that concept I'm not going to accept.

**Q** Is there going to be a third party in '56?


**A** I do not think so. Oh, I won't say there isn't going to be a third party, because we always have these minor parties that crop up, but I don't think there is going to be an effective third party in 1956.

**Q** Do you think that Senator McCarthy will not lead such a party?

**A** I do not believe he will do it. I think he himself has said he is a Republican and intended to remain a Republican.

**Q** What about the renomination and re-election of Mr. Eisenhower in 1956?

**A** I think the President has first to determine that himself. The record of the Administration in domestic and foreign policy as viewed by the party and the nation in 1956 will determine the presidential choice that year.



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THE ASSISTANT  
CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Pers-B-em  
28 Feb 1955

Dear Commodore:


Thank you very much for your kind letter of 15 February.

There is one item I am a little concerned about and that is with regard to Commander Marinke returning to the War College next February. If I made any such commitment I inadvertently violated one of our cardinal rules by not putting the word "tentative" before it. Marinke's cruise will not end until the Summer of '56 and due to the fact that stability is the order of the day, we cannot promise to bring him out that early even for such an important project as the study of the Battle of Surigao Strait. However, we will make every effort to make him available as soon as possible.

I enjoyed our little talk and you can be sure that I and all my people will always give the Naval War College strong support.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

  
John C. Daniel,  
Rear Admiral, USN.

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JOINT TASK FORCE 7  
TASK GROUP 7.3  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

15 March 1955

Dear Rafe:

I will be very happy to review your draft of the analysis of the Battle of Surigao Strait, but am glad that there is some time before publication as I cannot put much time on it during the next few months. My recollection of the battle is not completely clear by any means, but probably my memory will improve as I read through the draft. As I recall it now, we in Flag Plot were concerned over the nearness to Hibuson and the relatively small amount of room available, and, in addition, there was a problem involved in trying to keep track of enemy and own forces.

Reading the analysis will surely bring back memories of those most interesting days, memories which we share together. I hope that my comments will be of some help in your valuable work.

My own job seems to be going comparatively well although problems of all types seem to come up more frequently than one desires.

With my best regards.

Very sincerely,

  
JOHN SYLVESTER

Commodore R. W. Bates, U. S. Navy  
Naval War College  
Newport, R. I.

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